THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF TRADE NAME PROTECTION AND THE POLICY AGAINST CONSUMER DECEPTION
I
In an unfair competition suit to protect a trade name,' the question to be
adjudicated is whether or not one party will be permitted to exclude another
from using a particular name. Since the question concerns the right to prevent
another from using a certain name, it is perhaps natural that arguments
against protection often use the emotive word "monopoly." The force of this
term has been resorted to in efforts to restrict the ambit of protection in cases
where the second user of a name is not directly competing in a common market. The recent decision by the Second Circuit in Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v.
Wolfies RestaurantInC. 2 raises this controversial issue once again and resolves
I The term "trade name" will be used herein to mean a name used to designate a particular business establishment. Such firm names, identifying the seller rather than his goods,
are not registrable under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1958). Concerning technical
and nontechnical trade-marks and names, see 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR CO.PETMON AND
TRADE-MAucs § 66.1 (2d ed. 1950). The present comment is intended to analyze the anticompetitive aspects of trade symbol protection. ("Trade symbols" will be used to include
both trade-marks and trade names.) However, for convenience the textual discussion will
be limited to trade name cases.
It should be noted that trade-marks often "serve the dual function of identifying both
firm and product and so qualify as both trade-mark and trade name." Developments in the
Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HAxv.L. REv. 814, 822 (1955). It is frequently observed that the law of trade-marks is "but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition.. . ." United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (6th Cir. 1918);
Hanover Star Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 Fed. 513, 518 (7th Cir. 1918). See also
Alaska Sales & Service, Inc. v. Rutledge, 128 F. Supp. 1, 2 (1955); Insect-O-Lite Co. v.
Hagemeyer, 151 F. Supp. 829, 832 (1957). An examination of cases such as those cited infra
notes 3 and 16 shows that the courts app!y the same basic rules to trade-marks and trade
names and that in judicial opinions the combined actions for trade-mark infringement and
unfair competition become indistinguishable.
Some controversy exists as to the scope of protection afforded by Section 32(1) of the
Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1958). In S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175
F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge Learned Hand suggested that section 32(1) be interpreted as
codifying the law of unfair competition as it existed in 1946. Judge Clark, dissenting, was
inclined to interpret the section, as well as the existing law of unfair competition, as approving broader protection than suggested by Judge Hand. The controversy has not been clearly
resolved. See, e.g., the problem as treated in Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions,
Inc., 204 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1953); Browne-Vintners Co. v. National D. & C. Corp., 151 F.
Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). However, the above mentioned tendency of courts to treat
claims of trade-mark infringement and unfair competition as identical lends support to
Judge Clark's view favoring broader protection under section 32(1). See Developments in the
Law-Trade-Marksand Unfair Competition,68 HARv. L. Rv. 814, 849 (1955) (reasonably
suggesting that the Lanham Act section can be interpreted to include the confusion of sponsorship doctrine-a doctrine discussed infra note 16 and accompanying text). But even if
the protection of the Lanham Act is not fully coextensive with that provided by present
doctrines of unfair competition, regardless of whether trade-marks or trade names are being
discussed, the problems of analyzing anti-monopoly arguments remain the same.
2 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961).
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it, says a dissenting justice, by granting a permanent "non-statutory monopoly" to the complainants. 3 Since anti-monopoly thought may shape the law in
this field, it is important to consider the basis for trade name protection, the
meaning of "monopoly" as it has been applied, and the extent to which the
policy underlying monopoly arguments should influence decisions.
The Wolfies case illustrates a recurrent type of factual situation. 4 The plaintiffs operated two restaurants and sandwich shops called "Wolfies" in Miami

Beach, Florida. The defendant, with knowledge of the plaintiffs' prior use,
opened a restaurant called "Wolfies" in Brooklyn, New York. The evidence
revealed that the plaintiffs' Florida restaurants were particularly well known
in Brooklyn.5 The menu used by the defendant closely resembled the plaintiffs'
in color and format and offered "Wolfie's Floridian Style" delicacies. These
facts established a deliberate attempt by the defendant to encourage the belief
that this was a "Brooklyn branch of plaintiff's enterprises." 6 The majority of
the court held that such practices constituted "palming-off' 7 and affirmed the
decree for an injunction restraining the defendant from using the name
"Wolfies." Moore, dissenting, charged that the decision gave a Florida restaurateur, who had chosen a "not too unique nickname," "a non-statutory
monopoly through the medium of the 'unfair competition doctrine.' "s

I
Before examining anti-monopoly arguments, it is instructive to consider
first the basis and operation of the judicially accredited theory of trade name
protection. This approach coincides with the course of historical development,
for a doctrine of trade name protection was well established before monopoly
argunents were advanced.
3 Id at 304 (Moore, J.). Judge Frank endowed the Second Circuit with a strong under-

current of monopoly-resisting in trade name cases. See his opinions in: Triangle Publicatins, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969,974 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissentiog); La Touraine Coffee Co.
v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting); Standard Brands, Inc.
v. Staidlr, 151 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring); Eastern Wine Corp. v. WinlowWarren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1943).
4 See, e.g., cases involving restaurant names: Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257
F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948);
Nagrom Corp. v. Cock'N Bull, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1957); Ambassador East,
Inc. v. Shelton Corners, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Brass Rail Inc. v. Ye Brass Rail of Mass, Inc.,
43 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mass. 1938); Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193
N.Y.S.2d 332(Sup. CL 1959); James Burrough, Ltd.v.Ferrara, 8 Misc. 2d 819,169 N.Y.S.2d
93 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Maison Prmuier v. Prunie's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551,288
N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
5 The president of one of the plaintiEs testified that, at his Miami Beach restaurant, 50
to 60 per cent of the dafiy patronage was from Brooklyn. 291 F.2d at 303.
'Ibid.
The decision expressly rests on the "palming-off" doctrine, or more accurately, on an

acepted extension of that doctrine. See infra at 374.
' 291 F.2d at 304-05.
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The law of trade names has been predicated on the protection of the public
from deception. 9 Or, to phrase it differently, the primary aim has been to safeguard the identifying or informing function of trade symbols. 10 Pointing this
out does not, however, mean that judicial action has not also stemmed from
a desire to protect the good will associated with a businessman's trade name.
Yet, if the desire to protect symbolized good will had become the basic consideration shaping the law, the scope of protection would probably be broader.
The limited protection is best explained when the policy of preventing consumer deception is accepted as controlling and defining the scope of protection.'I The courts protect the good will associated with a complainant's trade
name only insofar as is required by the policy against consumer deception. Of
course, a complainant seeking relief is often more interested in protecting the
persuasive value, or magic selling power, of his name than in merely preserving
its identifying function.
The first rationale of legal action was to prevent one merchant, by the use
of the same or similar trade symbols, from "passing-off" or "palming-off" his
goods as those of another. 12 This simple rule expanded to meet the needs of a
more complex commercial society. The doctrine of confusion of source developed to deal with cases in which, despite the lack of market competition between the parties, the use of similar symbols created the false impression that
the goods emanated from the same source. In the famous case of Yale Elec.
Corp. v. Robertson'3 the court held that the maker of "Yale" locks was entitled to injunctive relief against the use of its mark on flashlights and batteries although it made neither flashlights nor batteries. Judge Learned Hand
declared that "it has come to be recognized that, unless the borrower's use is
so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification of the two, it
is unlawful."' 4 Such an expansion of the "passing-off" notion was logical, for,
despite the apparent contradiction of finding "unfair competition" without
competition, the purpose remained the same: to prevent consumer deception.
Finally, from the confusion of source doctrine emerged the modem doc9 The wrong to be remedied has often been viewed as a form of commercial fraud. The
Restatement of Torts treats trade names and marks as one topic in a chapter also dealing
with "the conditions of liability of one who fraudulently markets goods as those of another
or... who imitates the physical appearance of goods marketed by another." 3 RmSrATE mCr,
TORTS 535, 541 (1938).
10 See Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 Mici. L. REv. 967 (1952)" Advocates of more extensive trade name protection sometimes conveniently assume
that the established judicial doctrine is primarily intended to protect the reputation and good
will of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Note, The Monopoly Concept of Trade-Marks and Trade-Namres
and the "Free Ride" Theory of Unfair Competition, 17 GEo. WAsu. L. REv. 112 (1948).
12 3 RE STATE.m--T, TORTS § 717, comment a at 564 (1938).
13 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
14

Id. at 974.
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trine of confusion of sponsorship. Under this doctrine the appropriator of a
trade symbol will be enjoined if his acts are likely to create the impression
among ordinary customers' 5 that his business or product is associated with
or endorsed by the senior user.1 6 Although the court in the Wolfies case concluded that the defendant's practices amounted to "palming-off,"1 7 the case
is more accurately described as involving confusion of sponsorship. The
analogy to "palming-off" is, however, both appropriate and suggestihe: for
the'analogy indicates the logical expansion of the original rule into the more
broadly formulated likelihood of confusion test.' 8
The test applied is objective, and, therefore, injunctive relief can be obtained regardless of the appropriator's knowledge or intent.' 9 But the purpose,
IsThe touchstone is the 'ordinary purchaser" acting under the normall prevalent conditions in the trade and giving the attention usually given to the purchase of such goods or
services. He is essentially the familiar "reasonably prudent man.** 3 CALLSANN..". Op. cit.
supra note I, at § 81.2.
16 See cases cited supia note 4. In a number of cases the defendant's conduct created the
likelihood of a false impression of endorsement or recommendation by the plaintiff. Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948) (publishers of a girls' fashion
magazine called "Seventeen" obtained an injunction prohibiting the unauthorized use of
the label "Miss Seventeen" on girdles); Hanson v.Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74
(8th Cir. 1947) (publishers of -Seventeen" obtained an injunction against the use of the
name on dresses for girls); Esquire, Inc., v. Maira, 101 F. Supp. 398 (NI.D. Pa. 1951)
(publisher of "Esquire" fashion magazine for men obtained injunction against the use of
the name "Esquire" on a men's clothing shop); Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp.
875 (S.D. Fla. 1941); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara, 8 Misc. 2d 819, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93
(Sup. Ct. 1957) (injunctive relief granted to the distiller of "Beefeater" gin against the use
of that name on a restaurant selling liquor).
The issue of likelihood of confusion is an issue of fact as to the probable reactions of
ordinary customers. Q-Tips v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144, 147 (3rd Cir. 1953). See
also 3 REsrATEhmNr, ToRts § 728, comment a (1938). The factual nature of the issue leaes
some ambiguity in the law when new cases arise involving different markets and names, but
in all cases granting relief, the courts have found some colorable evidence of confusing
similarity. See, e.g., the controversial case of Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prod., Inc., 147 Misc.
679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
17 With reference to the defendant's conduct, the court concluded: "[Wje see no distinction between this and ordinary 'palming-off' in a products case." 291 F.2d at 303.
Is See 3 CAL SANN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1650-51; Note, 41 CoR.EL. L. Q. 515, 517
(1956). Under each of the three doctrines, i.e., "palming-off," confusion of source and confusion of sponsorship, the applicable test is the likelihood of confusion.
19 "Where the necessary and probable tendency of the defendant's simulation or resemblance of the plaintiff's trade name is to mislead the public into belieing that the defendant's
business is that of or connected with the plaintiff's, then neither actual confusion nor actual
fraudulent intent need be shown, for the court is then concerned with the consequences of
defendant's conduct and not the motive for them." Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Atlantic &
Pac. Trucking Corp.,51 N.J. Super. 412, 420, 144 A.2d 172, 176-77 (App. Div. 1958).
3 CALuANN, op. cit. supra note 1,at § 82.2(b)(1).
In the Wo/lfes case, Judge Moore correctly observed that "intent is not controlling."
291 F.2d at 305. Itis 16ong, however, to suggest further, as he does, that the uniqueness of
a trade name is the only factor that can bring a case within the confusion or "deception
category." For other factors, see 3 l~srATEmimrr, TORTS § 729 (1938).
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or bad faith, in choosing a particular name 20 can be an important factor in
determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. 21 The courts have been
"quick to grant relief in cases of fraud or bad faith, even though the businesses
of the litigants are not in competition." 22 A finding of bad faith plus an attempt to suggest the approval or recommendation of the prior user can be
decisive even though the attempted suggestion is only slightly deceptive and
appears almost humorously pathetic. 23 The presence of such bad faith explains some decisions in which the actual likelihood of mistaken association
would otherwise appear minimal. 24
One other factor affecting the issue of confusing similarity merits special
attention here because of its particular relevance to monopoly notions. The
factor is the degree of distinctiveness of the trade name. 25 An amorphous, but
useful, distinction between "'strong" and "weak" names prevails in the law.
26
The strength of a name depends both upon its popularity and distinctiveness.
The courts have frequently declared that the stronger the name, the wider the
ambit of protection, i.e., that the degree of strength affects the degree of
exclusive appropriation permitted the originator. 27 Names which are common, personal, 28 descriptive, or laudatory tend to be weak; 29 whereas
20 A reasonable explanation for the defendant's choice of a similar name will offset the
normal inference that he chose it with intent to deceive. The defendant in the Woles case,
however, "indulged in a series of fantastic explanations." 291 F.2d at 304 (Moore, J.). See
3 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note I, at § 82.2(b)(2).
21 As the American Law Institute observed: "[If a person] adopts his designation with

the intent of deriving benefit from the reputation of the trade-mark or trade name, his intent
may be sufficient to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity. Since he was and
is intimately concerned with the probable reaction in the market, his judgment manifested
prior to the controversy is highly persuasive. His denial that his conduct was likely to
achieve the result intended by him will ordinarily carry little weight." 3 REsrA-EMENT, Touts
§ 729, comment b at 595 (1938). An analogous type of reasoning is common in other areas
of the law. In antitrust law, "the most familiar example ... is the notion that proof of
intent to produce unlawful effects upon the market will provide a sufficient basis for concluding that the effects in question actually took place." Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and
the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 267, 297
n.94.
22 El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1954). In New York it is
a criminal offense, as well as a civil wrong, to use a confusingly similar trade name with the
intention of deceiving the public. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 964.
23 See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Stork Restaurant,
Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prod., Inc., 147
Misc. 677, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
2
4 See cases cited note 23 supra.
25 See, e.g., Jewel Tea Co. v. Kraus, 187 F.2d 278,282 (7th Cir. 1951); Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1950).
26 3 CALLMANN, op. cit. supranote 1, at § 82.1(1).
27 See note 25 supra.
2

8 Cases involving personal names are complicated by the feeling that one should have
the "inherent right" to the use of his own name. Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of Calif.,
Ltd., 60 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D. Cal. 1945). If the defendant chose a family name, despite

376

THE UNIVERSnT" OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:371

names which are coined, fanciful, or arbitrar% tend to be strong. A simple
rationale underlies the broader protection afforded distinctive names: the
more distinctive the name. the greater the probability that businesses using a
similar designation will be regarded as connected %%ith or approved by the
prior user.2' O
I!
With the common law doctrine and its operation thus briefly outlined, the
significance of monopoly notions may be examined. An anal%sis should begin
with a consideration of the meaning attached to the term 'monopoly.- for it
has frequently been employed, without discrimination, in two different senses.
First, "m6nopoly" can mean simply the exclusive right to, or exclusive possession of, something. 3 ' Second. the term may describe a market condition.
Monopoly. in the economic sense. ordinarily means control over the supply32
in a given market. 3 3 and consequently control over price. 3- 4 The exclusive right
and economic meanings are related, for an exclusive right may create market
powers, yet each meaning has been used to suggest different reasons for denythe presence of confusing similarity, the courts are inclined to order the addition of a first
name or prefix rather than grant the more drastic remedy of prohibiting the use of the name
itself. Lerner Stores Corp. v. Lerner, 162 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1947); Libby, McNeill & Libby
v. Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968 (D. Mass. 1952); J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Dougherty,
36F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Pa. 1940), 39 MicH.L. REv. 1047 11941).
Conversely, the drastic remedy is more likely %here the choice of a confusingl similar
name cannot be explained. Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of Calif., supra.
29 The popularity of a name and its association with a certain source or sponsor will
lend strength to a non-distinctive name. In Skil Corp. v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485, 494, 150
N.E.2d 551, 557 (1958), the court said: "Although Skil as a mark [or name] is not as
easy to protect as, a more unique one, its secondary meaning can be protected to an
appropriately limited extent."
3 3 RESTATEbmr, TORTS § 731, comment e (1938). Bat see Schechter, The RationalBasis
of TrademarkProtection,40 HARv.L. REv. 813, 831 (1927) ;here the author relies upon the
rue affording broader protection to distinctive names in order to buttress his argument
"that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational
basis for its protection .. ."
In considering the traditional willingness to protect strong names, it should be noted
that such names are ordinarily not imitated except with intent to deceive.
31See WEnsTER'S NEW L-NER.ATioAL DtcroRY (2d ed. 1957).

3ZCkAwjuBERL, TbE THEoRY or Mo.'opouLsr c CoMPETio. 7 (7th ed. 1956); S.sa'ELSON, Eco,-aocs 456 (4th ed. 1958).
33 The term "monopoly" is meaningless without reference to the market controlled. For
both the economist and the antitrust lawyer the definition of a market presents major difficulties. See notes 42-46 infra and accompanying text. On the problem of the "relevant
market" in antitrust law, see United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemnours & Co., 351 U.S.
377 (1956).
34 "The essence of full monopoly power resides in being the sole source of a product, so
that the buyer must meet the sellers terms or go without.... All the factors and elements
which constitute this idea are summed up by the convenient short-hand reference to monopoly pouer as power over price or power to exclude competitors." Arr'y GEN. NAT'L CO.".
A.vTRLuSr REP. 318 (1955).
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ing trade name protection. Only when these two meanings are clearly distinguished can the validity of monopoly-based arguments be rationally assessed.
Insofar as "monopoly" merely designates an exclusive right, the term legitimately applies to one's house and automobile as well as to protected trade
names. "Monopoly" is meaningless without reference to the subject-matter,
the something, to be monopolized. In a number of cases, courts have employed the exclusive-right meaning with the implication that the something
monopolized was the English language. For example, in one trade name case,
the court declared that to grant protection "would be tantamount to a gift of
exclusive ownership of the use of an English word." 35 The' dissent of Judge
Moore in the Wolfies case contains a rather obscure, undefined application of
the term "monopoly," but his reasoning seems to depend in part upon the
ideas that the something monopolized is the English language. Such reasoning
may reflect an understandable reluctance to create privileges concerning the
use of common words-words that seem to belong in the public domain. Perhaps connected with this reluctance is a vague feeling that, through advertising, a party should not be able to buy the privileged use of a common word. 36
But, regardless of any distaste for word "buying," it is submitted that the
common law doctrine of trade name protection raises no significant danger of
a language-monopoly. First, the exclusive rights to a name are quite limited.
These rights do not extend beyond the commercial, denominative use of the
words and the bounds of the likelihood of confusion doctrine. As has been
indicated, the rights to common, descriptive, and laudatory words-i.e., to
generally "weak" names-are particularly restricted. Furthermore, if a product name becomes generic, all claims to exclusive rights will be denied. Thus
when it is found that a name such as "shredded wheat" has become the household name for a product, the law will allow others to adopt that name.37 This
rule enables a newcomer to describe his product as it is described in the
common language so that there will be an opportunity for competition. Second, an emphasis upon the rights to a specific name ignores the infinity of
names remaining.38 If, for a moment, market conditions may be laid aside
3

SMajestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Elec. Appliance Co., 79 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Ohio

1948). See also Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969,973 (9th Cir. 1950);
California Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971,974-75. (7th Cir. 1947).
36 See S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940). See also
Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 105, 109 (1957).
37

In

Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938), the Supreme

Court stated that, since "shredded wheat" was a generic term, "the original maker of the
product acquired no exclusive right to use it. As Kellogg Company had the right to make
the article, it had, also, the right to use the term by which the public knows it."
38

Some judicial statements have stressed the infinity of names freely available to a newcomer. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 361 (9th Cir. 1948); Maison Prunier
v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 553, 288 N.Y.S. 529, 531 (Sup. Ct.

1936).
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and only the resources of the English language are considered, it seems obvious
that no undue hardship arises from requiring that a party choose a name
which is not confusingly similar. When the limitations on name-rights and
the infinity of names remaining are noted, there appears to be no significant
danger of depleting the available vocabulary. Indeed, one may reasonably
sympathize with the feeling of Judge Clark, who once, when confronted iith
a language-monopoly argument, simply replied that, "a monopoly of the
words39 'La Touraine-Lorraine' for a coffee-bean hardly seems world shatterin g ,
The unfavorable connotation attached to "monopoly" derives from its
economic meaning. Judge Frank, the most outspoken judicial exponent of an
anti-monopoly policy in this field, generally used "'monopoly'"in an economic
sense. 0 Resisting what he interpreted as an unwarranted extension of the
common law rules, he said:
Without doubt, the judge-made trade-name doctrine or concept fosters
monopolies and, generally speaking, the common-law tradition is inimical
to monopolies (although opposition to monopoly when it takes the form of
obsessive monopoly-phobia becomes absurd). Some writers, disturbed by
the suggestion that udicially-protected trade-names are monopolies, protest that the judicial protection of trade-names rests on prevention of unfairness between competitors, not on protection of monopoly. But, no
matter by what doctrinal path the courts arrive at their results in this field,
the judicial restraints of the defendants do yield plaintiff's monopolies. To
the pra
!cal,
social consequences of their decisions, the courts ought not
shut their eyes. A concept is what it does. If a legal concept produces a
monopoly, the concept, pragmatically, is a concept favoring monopoly. 41
With regard to this demand for a realistic appraisal, it must be recognized
that protected trade symbols do have monopolistic aspects. Trade symbols
persuade as well as inform; by differentiating a product or business, they
tend to lift it out of its general competitive class into a class of its own.4 2
Product homogeneity is usually considered a prerequisite for pure or perfect
competition. 43 The differentiation introduced by trade symbols may, therefore, result in market prices not wholly explicable by reliance upon models of
pure or perfect competition. Professor Chamberlin emphasized the similarity
between patents and trade-marks: "Each makes a product unique in certain
respects; this is its monopolistic aspect. Each leaves room for other commodities almost but not quite like it; this is its competitive aspect. The differences
39

LaTouraine Coffee Co. %.Lorraine Coffee Co.. 157 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1946).

4

OSee cases cited note 3 supra.

41 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 982 (2d Cir. 1948).
4Z See Borchardt, Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem?31 GEo. LJ. 245, 246 (1943).
43 SA3uELSO., op. cit. supra note 32, at 452-55.
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between them are only in degree .. . ."44 If attention thus focuses upon departures from the theoretical models of pure or perfect competition, it may seem
logical to conclude that a protected trade symbol creates a separate, insulated
market where price is independent of the price of similar goods or services
that would otherwise be in the same market. 45 But a "market" should be defined as the sphere of competitive rivalry within which consumers can freely
transfer their patronage from one supplier to another. 46 This definition suggests that similar products or services, sold under different trade symbols, may
be effective substitutes and hence within the same market. It is within such a
market Jhat the monopoly power of a name should be measured. In assessing
the importance of the monopolistic effects of protected trade names, both
legal writers and courts have tended to gloss over the difficult problems of
determining the market and of measuring the market powers that are created.
A recognition of the monopoly implications of trade name law leads to the
question of whether the protection afforded trade-marks and trade names
raises antitrust problems. Although there has been some controversy, the
better view is that the protection of a trade symbol per se does not create antitrust problems. 47 The relevant market in which the power of a symbol is to
be measured Nvill include similar goods or services sold under different symbols
and competing as effective substitutes. Antitrust law does apply, however,
where a party has used its mark or name to implement a general anti-competitive scheme.48 The opinion of the Supreme Court in the DuPont Cellophane
case 49 lends support to the view that trade name protection raises no inherent
antitrust problems. With specific reference to Professor Chamberlin's observations, the Court said:
Thus one can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every
nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the
price and production of his own product.50 However, thii power that, let
us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal
power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the
products.51
44 CHAMBERLIN, Op. cit.

supra note 32, at 62.

45 See id. at 56-70.

46
47

See ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 322 (1955).

OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANrrITRus LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 908-12 (2d ed. 1959).
See generally Developments in the Law-Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 814,895-908 (1955). But cf. Borchardt,supra note 42; Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 323 (1943).
48 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). See generally Borchardt, supra note 47; Timberg, supra note 47.
49 United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
5o The Court cited CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, ch. IV.
351 U.S. at 393 n. 20.
5 351 U.S. at 393.
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unfak mpetion does
by the law
Wbg tbe fiettinstioi, 1,9d
no acu "igal mmopofie" wi tin the antitrust acts, opions differ as to
wbbc or not the market effects oimn protection afford a sufficient reason
for restring the judicial trade name doctrine. Some commentators, fearing
m poistic tendencies, approve protection under the confusion of source
dearoe but apparently oppose the sponsorship doctrine with its broader
scope. s2 Others accept the latter doctrine and further contend that trade name
protection is essentially consonant with effective competition.53
Significantly, the opponents of monopoly, while pointing to the economic
effects of the judicial doctrine, usually request only a restriction of trade name
protection. With the notable exception of Professor Chamberlin,54 neither
judges nor writers have advocated the abolition of all protection. Judge Frank,

for example, simply challenged the desirability of extending protection to cases
in which the defendant operated in a different field of business. 55 Similarly,
Judge Moore in the Wolfies case merely objected to protection where the defendants, because of their geographical location, were not competing in the
same market. In fact there is almost universal agreement that there should be
no limitation of trade name protection where parties compete in the same
region in the same class of goods or services. Yet this protection in the immediate market is precisely that most capable of conferring price immunities and
market powes Thus the economic argument is not advanced where prima
fackit should be most persuasive. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency and for the position taken by the law would seem to be that the desire to
pmm consumer deception has been controling.
Preventing consumer deception is not simply a negative policy. Underlying
U2Sce Dam

lLweresw: Legal Proterdm of Trade SmboLs,

Advaetir amd tAe Pk

57 YALE LJ. 1165 (1948); Tmaberg sa note 47; 21inkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition:
S4aumW TnwEvur a Pate, Ant,"rt, Trade-Mark, and Unfa Conmpetitkon Smts, 53 YALE
L. 514 (1944).
ThcopUiXU ofJudge Frank are generaly in accord with the views presated by the above
cited writas. Iis opinion in Triangl Pubications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1948), reveals a rehxne to accept the now judicially accredited confusion of sponsorship
dodri. See caes dited maa notes 3 & 16.
53See Note, mra note 11; PattkaL s'a note 10. The first authorstreses what may be
is that the good will
cafla the -frnits o(comnpetitio" argument. The proposition suted
ofa baisnem is the -fruit ofa free ecoomy- and that rules presring sudh benefits augment
competitive intives. Appealing as the argument is, it shoutd be noted that in granting
fimuitto me party, the law may be careating marke controlling pov~s thatwl discourage

the cometie in
oda

tve o(otbrs. The test forcompetion,sised by the author is freedom

to the mke

In uin this ta,

be

Inpliethat trade nmne poction has had no

monopolistic im;Aicatiu. But as another writer his indicated, in the tobacco
s
iniway, where price competition isnot keen, -the differentiation promnoted through brand
uisy tend to euhode potential aoapetitor. See Murcuw, Sikamyane of the
Cowmay Cse, 26 N.C.L REv. 139, 163 (1948).
TabA

A
5

QAmE KN ,

op. eit. mia note 32, at 270-74.

" See cams cited zu-pa note 3.

19621

COMMENTS

it is the idea-similar to that found in the law of contracts-that a consumer
should act as a free, informed party. Since couirts rule that imitation causing
confusing similarity is a civil wrong, trade symbols provide a reasonably reliable indication of the quality to be expected from goods and services. In doing
this, trade symbols help the consumer make a more informed, and hence
freer choice. Professor Chamberlin recognized the basic need for some means
of quality indication but nevertheless he argued in favor of "trade-mark infringement and 'unfair trading.' "56 To replace the present law governing
trade symbols, he suggested two alternative means of providing quality information. Either (I) the courts might follow a policy of permifting the imitation
of a trade symbol only if the goods or services were identical in quality or
(2) the legislature would abolish the protective rules by defining standards of
quality by law. He conceded that the first alternative was "condemned by its
impracticability," 57 presumably because of the difficulties and uncertainties
attendant upon a distinction between what is and is not identical in quality.
Despite Professor Chamberlin's suggestion to the contrary, the second alternative seems equally impracticable. Even if it is relatively easy to define quality
standards for staple products, it is highly improbable that, with respect to
other goods and services, legislators could establish meaningful standards with
sufficiently fine gradations to make the consumer aware of the range and
variety of qualities from which he may choose.
With the exception of Professor Chamberlin, there has been at least implicit
approval of the controlling importance of the informing function of trade
names. An acceptance of the policy against consumer deception justifies protection wherever there is a likelihood of confusion. As has been indicated, the
confusion of sponsorship doctrine stems from the old "passing-off" concept
and is but a logical extension of the same basic policy. The sponsorship doctrine may preserve powers created by protection within the immediate competitive market. However, the effect is indirect for this broader doctrine restricts non-competitors. It is submitted, therefore, that despite the monopolistic implications, to be consistent with their main objective, the courts should
continue to apply the sponsorship doctrine within the limits of a reasonable
likelihood of confusion.
IV
The main force of anti-monopoly argument has been directed at the socalled "dilution theory," a much discussed new departure in the law of trade
marks and names.5 8 Judge Frank once described Callmann-a protagonist of
56 CHAMBERLIN, Op. cit. supra note 32, at 270.

57 Id.at 273.
Frank I. Schechter initiated the American discussion of the new theory. Schechter,
supra note 30. The history of the theory is too well known to require review, but for a
58

382

THE UNIVTE.RSfY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. '9:371

the dilution theory--as an "enthusiastic supporter of trade-name monopolies2'5' The advocates of this new theory desire a scope of protection beyond
that provided by the confusion doctrine. Their main objective is to protect
highly distinctive trade symbols from imitations causing a gradual erosion
or dilution of the symbols' persuasive value or selling power.

It has been suggested that this theory "extends the owner's rights so far that
he has a virtual monopoly on the commercial, denominative use of the words
in the English language."O6 The term "monopoly" is used here in the exclusive-right sense with the familiar type of reference to a possible languagemonopoly. It is true that, if the dilution theory is applied as suggested by its
advocates, it would provide unlimited protection against the commercial imitation of coined, fanciful, and-perhaps--"very strong" names.61 Although
four states have adopted the theory by statute, 62 thus far the principal effect
of these statutes has been to assure that courts tending to cling to the narrow

"passing-off" concept will accept the confusion of sponsorship doctrine. 63 No
sample of dilution advocacy, see 3 CAum,
, op. ci. supra note 1,at § 842; Derenberg
The Pyabem of Diltionand the Antidioia Stanes,44 CAIF. L REv. 439 (1956).
Fora sample of dilution opposition, see Brown, mipranote 52; Middleton, Some Reflectim a
ion, 42 TkADEMArx REP. 175 (1952).
Ile kading advocates of the dilution theory concede that no cases have turned on
(atinakm 3 CALutAwNop.cit.sarpranote 1, at § 84.2; Derenberg,supraat451. Hovever,
fore" states have adopted the theory by statutef GA. CoDE AN.. §§ 106-15 (1956). ILL.
Rzv. STAT. ch . 140, §22(1959); MAre. OsI. LAws Ai.N. ch 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. GEN,
Bs LAw § 363-3(3). The Maam setts and New York statutes, wrhich are identical, provide: "LAikiood of ijury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of
a trade name or trade-nark shall be a grmnd for injunctive relief in cases of trade-niark
ik
xcint or unfair c
ition, notwithstanding the absence of competition betiecen
tie patie or the alm of confusion as to the source of goods or services."
The I2nham Act does not accept the dilution doctrine as a basis for relief in trade-nmark
15 US.C.§ 1114(1) (1958). See Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp.
293, 299 (S.DN.Y.1953)_
59 Tiangle Publications, i. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1948).
d Note, 41 CmiwN.
LQ. 515, 518 (1956). See also the criticism by Brown, supra note
52, at 1200,of the thesis advanced by Caflman in He Who Reap Where He Has Not So wn:
Uzjmu awiw
in the Law of Urfair Conpetiox, 55 H~zv. L. REv. 595 (1942).
di Although the dilution advocates have primanrily emphasized the need to protect coined
and fanciful names, Callnaun asserts that the theory would also protect -very strong"
namies. 3 CAuA,.%, op. cit. mupra note 1, at 1644 n.6 (Supp. 1961). Derenberg favors the
appikation of the theoy in the -extraordinary cases [of] family names such as Triffany." "
IDeebeg, swa note 58, at 458. But query whether this view will necessarily prevail under
the statutes. See the statutes szwa note 58 and also the judicial attitude to%%ard personal
name,sra note 28.
62 See note 58 =Wra.
63 Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg., 243 F.2d 540 (Ist Cir. 1957); HMH Publishing
Co. v. Playboy Records, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. 111. 1958); Libby, McNeill & Libby
v. Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968 (D. Mass. 1952); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc. 83
F. Supp. 455 (D. Mass. 1943); Skil Corp v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485, 150 N.E.2d 551 (1958).
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case has yet arisen under the statutes in which a different result would obtain
under the common law sponsorship doctrine.64 Nevertheless, on the assumption that the statutes create greater rights to very distinctive names, the English language will not be significantly depleted. By definition, the theory will
not extend any privileges over words already diluted by usage in the common
language.63
In evaluating the economic implications of the dilution doptrine, two factors should be carefully weighed and balanced. First, the extensive protection
proposed by the dilution advocates could increase and solidify whatever market powers are already created by the confusion doctrine. Of course, the
monopolistic consequences, whatever their proportions, will be indirectly produced since the additional protection would be only against non-competitors.
Second, the policy favoring the new doctrine depends upon the extent to which
it is desirable to protect a businessman's good will. The confusion doctrine
safeguards the reputation of a firm against imitators whose businesses are
closely related enough to cause a likelihood of mistaken association. While
further protection of good will may be desirable, that desirability should be
shown to depend upon social and econoinic considerations and not upon the
bare assertion that a business has a "property interest" to be preserved.6 6 As
one writer has observed, in this field the property notion obscures issues and
invites circular reasoning: "It purports to base legal protection upon economic
value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a [trade name]
depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected." 67
V
The indiscriminate use of the term "monopoly" may be criticized. In its
exclusive-right sense, the term has been employed to suggest potential dangers
to the English language. In view of the limited rights granted and the resources of the language, this suggestion appears to be a thinly veiled ad terrorem argument that has only obscured other issues. With its economic meaning, however, the cry of "monopoly" has at least removed any lingering illusion that courts or writers can reason in terms of trade name concepts divorced from social and economic facts. The differentiation encouraged by the
judicial trade name doctrine does create some insulation from the full force of
competitive pressures. Despite the market effects of the common law doctrine,
64 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 63. For an excellent review of the antidilution statute

cases, see Derenberg, supra note 58, at 448-61. But see that author's observation on Skil
Corp. v. Barnet, supra note 63, in Trade Regulation, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 846, 850 n.175
(1959).
65 See Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg., 243
N.C.L. REV. 105 (1957).
66

F.2d 540,

543, (1st Cir. 1957),

36

See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM.L. REV.

809, 814-17 (1935).

67 Cohen. supra note 66. at 815.
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there has been almost universal approval of protection within the immediate
competitive market. While this protection is certainly the most likely to have
monopolistic effects, the policy against consumer deception has been accepted
as controlling and will justify even the confusion of sponsorship doctrine. But
the case for the new departure embodied in the dilution statutes is more difficult. As the common law doctrine stands, the good will of a business and the
persuasive value of a trade name are protected within the limits set by the
confusion doctrine. Increased protection would tend to reinforce existing
market powers. On the assumption that competition should be encouraged
when there is no danger of consumer deception, the burden of persuasion
should rest upon the advocates of the new theory to demonstrate that increased protection is truly desirable. This approach will, it is hoped, at least
provoke economic research that will afford law makers reliable guidance.

